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The right to health is enshrined in Brazil’s 1988 constitution, dubbed ‘the Citizens’ 
Constitution’ for giving legal form to the demands mobilised in the struggle for 
democratisation. The realisation of this right is intimately linked with the pursuit of 
accountability. The architecture of the Brazilian health system has at its foundation an 
acknowledgement of the contribution that citizens can make to equitable and efficient service 
delivery through their role in mechanisms of accountability. The right to health is instantiated 
in the monthly meetings of conselhos de saúde, health councils, at municipal, state and 
national level, in which representatives of civil society come together with health workers 
and representatives from the municipal government to audit health spending and approve 
health plans. Endowed with the power to make binding decisions, the conselhos are mandated 
by law to approve budgets, plans and accounts before monies can be released from the federal 
coffers.  
 
The health of the population is a fundamental resource for the nation; and maintaining 
national health systems that can deliver services to the mass of the population, especially 
those who can least afford health care, is of significant symbolic as well as political and 
economic importance. Yet the provision of public health services also requires resources. It 
involves significant investment and management of public monies, and difficult decisions 
over allocations of ever-diminishing budgets. Throw in the complications of a mixed health 
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system, where there is statutory acknowledgements of the limits of state provision and the 
need to contract out particular services to the private sector, and add historic distrust on the 
part of citizens in the probity of its bureaucrats, and the interplay between the realisation of 
rights and demands for accountability become all the more complicated. 
 
This chapter is about how citizens in the small north-eastern Brazilian municipality of Cabo 
de Santo Agostinho, in the state of Pernambuco, have sought to realise the right to health 
through efforts to exact accountability from their municipal government. It tells the story of 
the evolution of the town’s municipal health council, and reflects on some of the challenges 
for the realisation of the right to health that persist. It begins by introducing the health 
councils, their structure and functions, and the political context out of which they arose. It 
then goes on to explore the origins and evolution of the municipal health council in Cabo. 
Focusing on some of its successes and shortcomings in the pursuit of accountability, the 
chapter reflects on some of the challenges faced by citizen actors in pursuing the right to 
health through these institutions.1  
 
Brazil’s health councils: new democratic spaces? 
Popular participation in the governance of health services has been on the international health 
agenda since the 1970s (Loewenson 1999; Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur 2000). In many of 
the co-management and consultative institutions established as part of health sector reforms, 
citizens are provided with opportunities for involvement in discussion, and sometimes in 
decision making, over making the delivery of health services more effective. Less commonly 
found are institutions that offer citizens a role in deliberation over health policy and the 
nature of health service provision, matters that are often retained as functions of the state. 
Rarer still are institutions that endow social actors – not merely individual citizens but the 
representatives of organised civic associations – with the legal right to approve budgets and 
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health plans, and play a part in ensuring accountable governance. This is the function of 
Brazil’s innovative participatory health councils (Coelho 2004; Coelho and Nobre 2004; 
Coelho, Pozzoni and Cifuentes 2005). Operating at each of the three levels of government – 
municipal, state and national – the health councils lend shape to a set of norms and 
institutional arrangements for the provision and governance of health care that provide new 
opportunities for citizens to engage directly in holding the state to account for their right to 
health. Each municipal and state government in the country is obliged to have a health 
council, with a structure that is predetermined by national decree. 
 
The Brazilian health system – the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) seeks to embody the basic 
principles of universality, equity, decentralisation and controle social, a term which 
constitutes only part of what the word ‘accountability’ has come to mean in English. Health 
councils are organs of accountability in a number of senses.2 They are sites for the pursuit of 
fiscal accountability, in which citizen representatives can literally audit the accounts of the 
local government, and pick up and pursue any anomalies. They are also sites for 
answerability, as public sphere institutions to which public officials are obliged to present 
accounts and explanations for health spending. And they are sites that provide citizen groups 
with a direct interface with health policy decision makers at every level, and which serve – in 
theory at least – to maintain the accountability of these public officials to diverse publics. 
They are open to members of the public and, whilst only elected councillors have the right to 
vote, all present have the right of voice.  
 
Brazil’s health councils represent a form of governance institution that has gained 
considerable popularity in recent years as a space for ‘cogovernance’ (Ackerman 2003). 
Writing on the challenges for accountability of these new governance institutions, Cornwall, 
Lucas and Pasteur (2000) suggest that one of their most pressing challenges is overcoming 
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embedded hierarchies that are so much a feature of the health sector, especially in the 
constitution of expertise and ‘ignorance’. In Brazil, an unusual confluence of influences has 
made these dynamics more complex. For the generation of medical professionals now in 
senior positions within the public health system and in non-statutory health organisations, the 
national health system and its participatory institutions was the fruit of a long and intense 
struggle by the radical public health movement (the movimento sanitarista) of the 1970s and 
1980s, in which many of them took part as medical students. A deep commitment to public 
health and to the right to health arose out of this movement, and inspired a generation of 
visionary doctors, whose agency has been so crucial at every level to seeking the success of 
democratising health reforms.  
 
The system of participatory health councils was envisaged by the health reformers who 
mobilised for its institutionalisation both as a means of creating an interface for civil society 
with the government and as a further political means of democratising Brazilian society, by 
stimulating the engagement of associations, movements and other forms of popular 
organisation with the process of governance. The councils were seen as providing a 
complement to the representative democratic system, involving representation of a different 
kind – of civil society organisations rather than elected politicians. The councils are 
composed according to strict rules of parity. Civil society organisations constitute 50 per cent 
of the council’s representatives. They are elected by civil society delegates at municipal 
conferences or in municipal assemblies. Representatives of health workers make up 25 per 
cent of the council’s members, and include primary health care auxiliary nurses and outreach 
workers, doctors and specialist health workers. The last 25 per cent is made up of 
representatives from the municipal health secretariat and contracted-out service providers, 
consisting of the Secretary of Health, and managers of municipal hospitals and clinics in the 
public and private sector. 
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The notion of controle social, literally ‘social control’, represents at once the idea of ‘the 
people’ controlling what is rightly theirs and the enlistment of publics in the auditing of 
health spending. The term is often taken to extend to citizen engagement in health policy and 
planning, and to represent the right to participate at every level and in every aspect of health 
sector decision making. Yet in practice, as we go on to suggest, there are limits to citizen 
participation in this context that constrain the possibilities for engagement to a narrower 
auditing role.  
 
Background 
 
The municipality of Cabo de Santo Agostinho, with a principally urban population of just 
over 150,000 people, lies in the Greater Recife area in the state of Pernambuco. The town is 
an important economic centre because of its strategic location, its established industrial 
facilities and its expanding service sector, especially in the tourism, health and retail sectors. 
Despite those economic potentialities, Cabo de Santo Agostinho has low human development 
and infant development indices, substantial populations of people below the poverty line and 
an illiteracy rate of 21 per cent [source?]. Its mixed epidemiological profile reflects the 
diseases of poverty and those associated with urban living, such as cardiovascular and 
degenerative disease. Health services are provided at neighbourhood health posts, and by 
referral to municipal and private hospitals in the town of Cabo de Santo Agostinho itself. The 
successful implementation of a national primary health care programme – which involves 
teams of community health agents, who are linked to health posts staffed by a doctor and 
nurses, doing regular house-to-house visits – has brought marked improvements over the last 
seven years in a range of health outcomes, from a drop in the infant mortality rate (from 
41/1000 to 18/1000) to reduced hospital admissions figures.  
Chapter 7 
Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability 
 6
 
Cabo has a rich history of social movement mobilisation, dating back to agrarian struggles, 
the engagement of the progressive Catholic church, informed by Liberation Theology, during 
the period of the dictatorship, and a strong feminist movement with regional and national 
connections. Immediately after the return to democratic rule, a progressive democratic party 
held the municipal government until shortly after the first wave of implantation of the 
conselhos. A diversity of social movements, NGOs and corporate social actors exist in both 
urban and rural areas in the municipality. Some of these are long-standing organisations, 
supported by the progressive Catholic church’s work with base communities. Others came 
into being as a result of the first wave of democratisation in the late 1980s with support from 
the municipal government, and continue to benefit from municipal government subvenções 
(literally subsidies, grants to support their activities). Others still are directly contracted 
through convênios, statutory agreements, with the municipal government for the delivery of 
social and health services. There are around 130 registered civil society organisations in the 
municipality, and many more small community-based organisations dealing with issues in 
their immediate locality. The character of the state and of civil society, the nature of mutual 
dependencies and of cross-cutting links that exist across their borders, mediated by the church 
and by political parties, is extremely significant in making sense of the struggles for 
accountability in the municipality.  
 
Cabo’s municipal health council: laws, structures and purpose 
 
Cabo’s municipal health council (conselho municipal de saúde, CMS hereafter) was officially 
inaugurated by Municipal Law 1.687 on 12 May 1994, according to Federal Laws 8080/90 
and Law 1840 /90. It was established with the following goals: 
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1 To define municipal health priorities; 
2 To establish guidelines to be followed when making the municipal health plan; 
3 To act on making strategies and controlling the application of the health policy; 
4 To propose criteria for financial and budget planning and application of the municipal 
health fund, auditing transfers and use of resources; 
5 To follow, evaluate and audit health services provided to the population by public and 
private institutions with SUS service contracts in Cabo; 
6 To define quality criteria for the functioning of public and private health services 
within the SUS; 
7 To call the municipal health conference every two years, together with the executive, 
according to the Lei Orgânica da Saúde (Basic Health Law). 
 
Cabo’s CMS is made up of 20 members and 20 substitutes, distributed as follows: 10 service 
users; 5 health professionals; 3 public managers; 2 representatives of private services with 
contracts with SUS. Its legal status is that of a collective body of public administration linked 
to the executive branch of government. The CMS meets once a month for 3–5 hours, 
meetings are open to the general public and take place in a central location in Cabo, in a 
building – the Casa de Conselhos (‘House of the Councils’) - provided by the municipal 
government. 
 
The CMS was established in Cabo just as the progressive Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) government lost office to the conservative Partido da Frente 
Liberal (PFL). In its initial years, there was little opportunity to develop its potential. As in 
many parts of Brazil, the council came to be an extension of the municipal government, filled 
with appointments made by government and serving as a mechanism for rubber-stamping the 
government’s decisions. This period of crisis was extremely significant in shaping the current 
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CMS. Popular movements, progressive Church interests, unions and the feminist movement 
joined forces in a popular front to pressurise the municipal government to democratise the 
health council. The return of progressive government in 1997 was accompanied by the 
recruitment of an energetic, radical reformer into the position of Secretary of Health, and the 
revitalisation of the CMS and reforms to the health system that ushered in what is today’s 
SUS in the municipality.  
 
While citizens can attend and have rights of voice in health council meetings, councillors are 
elected as representatives of civil society organisations. Terms are for two years, renewable 
for a further term. In 2000, the health council elected its first civil society chair – one of the 
first in Brazil, where it is usually the municipal health secretary who takes up this position. 
During 2000–2, intense discussions within the CMS gave rise to internal regulations that 
sought to further democratise the action of the council. Rules of representation were evolved 
to ensure a diversity of communities of place and of interest, with half of the civil society 
seats being allocated to representatives of neighbourhood associations and the remaining half 
to those representing particular interest groups, such as the women’s movement, the black 
movement and disabled people. These efforts culminated in the largest municipal health 
conference held to date, in 2003, at which new councillors were elected by several hundred 
delegates who had been elected at pre-conferences in four regions of the municipality. 
Ranging in age from their early 20s to their late 60s, most of Cabo’s councillors are lower-
middle-class or working-class, on average having no more than secondary schooling and 
often only primary level education. During 2003–5, the council’s civil society complement 
consisted of civil society organisations as diverse as an Afro-Brazilian cultural centre, a 
herbal medicine non-governmental organisation (NGO), an association representing 
‘progressive’ elements of the Protestant church, a Catholic workers’ movement and a 
feminist NGO, along with residents’ associations from all over the municipality. To extend 
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the health council’s scope yet further, in recent years efforts were made to inaugurate local 
health councils in neighbourhoods in the municipality.  
 
The health council is notionally autonomous and thus independent of the municipal 
government. In practice, however, it is reliant on the secretariat of health to provide resources 
for it to function effectively, including paying for the costs associated with administrative 
support. This support is critical to the council’s viability, as the administrator not only keeps 
records of meetings, prepares documents for councillors to read and convenes meetings, but 
also reminds the councillors of the meetings, keeps them up to date with any changes in 
policy at state or national level that are communicated to her by councillors involved at those 
levels, and helps to organise training, transport of councillors and logistics for participating in 
events such as conferences. Charged with functions that require both significant investments 
of time and money, this infrastructure and resourcing is critical – underfunding undermines 
both the possibility of the council being able to exercise social control effectively, and the 
trust that members have in the seriousness with which their work is taken by the government.  
 
Council members are entitled to demand access to public health accounts and explanations 
about certain investment and spending decisions, as well as to pay visits to clinics, health 
units, and hospitals to carry out spot checks. An auditing committee, composed of two CMS 
councillors and a member of the public, is charged with carrying out a number of such 
checks, examining stock cupboards for expired or badly stored medicines and inspecting the 
facilities. The mandate of the councillors extends beyond that of a watchdog, however, in 
their function as representatives of broader community interests. One of their tasks is to 
consult broadly amongst their constituents about local health plans, and to become directly 
involved in organising biannual health conferences, where such plans are opened to 
discussion. Councillors’ own perceptions of what being a member of the CMS entails varies 
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significantly, as does the way in which they frame their role in relation to the task of holding 
government to account. In a participatory workshop, councillors gave the functions of the 
health council as follows:3 
 
 To facilitate popular participation in health public policies; to define priorities, audit 
resources and evaluate results. 
 To develop projects as well as to audit what is approved by the council. 
 To promote social control, with popular and democratic participation. 
 To contribute to the system’s better functioning, with popular participation. 
 To enforce peoples’ rights, already guaranteed by SUS. 
 To audit users’ demands for good service. 
 To exercise social control through organised civil society, playing a central role and 
directing public policies for the sector. 
 To jointly discuss and establish the best options for public policy. 
 To propose and to follow public policies. 
 To be a deliberative body where members have the opportunity to audit and to contribute 
to health policies. 
 To provide citizens with conditions conducive to participation in public health policies in 
the community. 
 To contribute to the management, auditing and construction of health policy. 
 
A lack of clarity over what the role of the council ought to be, and what its limits actually are, 
is one of the factors that hampers the work of the council. Newly appointed councillors are 
sent on training courses, of variable quality, which teach them the basics about what their role 
involves, and instruct them in the various technical procedures that are part of health 
budgeting and planning. This is, however, a rather rudimentary education: necessarily so, as 
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the costs of providing such training are significant. Councillors talked about how useful and 
important the training they had received was for them, and how much they valued 
opportunities to go on further courses and attend events in the nearby metropolis, Recife, 
including state-level conferences on a range of health-related topics. For those who had been 
able to take up these opportunities, they were regarded as an invaluable opportunity for 
personal as well as professional growth, expanding their horizons and bringing them into 
contact with similar people from other municipalities. Not everyone, however, is interested in 
taking up these opportunities or able to do so, and there is a general feeling in the council that 
people do not have enough of an idea of what exactly they are there to do.  
 
People enter the council with expectations that are shaped by their previous experiences, 
whether in political parties, social movements or their own communities. Their own 
interpretations of what controle social ought to be all about play a part in defining what for 
them are the appropriate concerns of the council, as well as the boundaries of their own 
interventions in this space. How do these different perceptions of the function of the health 
council play out in practice? The next section explores some of the everyday dynamics of the 
health council, and the meanings of accountability and rights that citizen representatives, 
health workers and managers bring to their engagement with the health council.  
 
Accountability in practice 
 
The everyday business of the CMS ranges from listening to presentations by organisations 
who deliver services, to being informed about the plans of the municipal health secretariat, to 
discussing specific incidents that have been reported by members of the public concerning 
the provision of health services. There is little deliberation on matters of health policy; health 
plans are prepared by the government, without any attempt to engage the participation of 
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health councillors in their formulation, and presented to the council for their approval, along 
with periodic presentations of the accounts. There is equally little expectation on the part of 
health councillors that they will be involved in the health policy and planning process, even 
though some see their responsibility in these terms.  
  
Examination of the minutes of the CMS for the last three years reveals a series of patterns of 
interaction between health bureaucrats, citizens and health workers. One is a pattern of 
information provision followed by question and answer, which generally involves one of the 
managers, and most often the Secretary of Health. There is often little or no deliberation over 
the issues brought for consultation, nor does there appear to be any expectation of a more 
broad-ranging discussion: they are presented as matters of fact, questions are asked, and the 
matter is closed. This is the way that the municipal health plans tend to be treated. Another 
pattern is one of clarifying or contesting the way in which things are being done by debating 
whether something should be on the agenda, whether the council needs to have a position or a 
policy, and so on. At times, this appears to be about the council exploring the boundaries of 
what they are expected to do, at times about finding ways of working more effectively. Yet 
another interaction is more adversarial, generally involving denunciations of the quality of 
care or lack of services available in public health facilities, but also extending to critique of 
particular medical staff or failures to provide certain services. Rarely does this turn into 
constructive debate as to what to do about it, taking a more predictable pattern of making a 
complaint, and the complaint being recorded.  
 
The minutes of the health council meetings support the impressions that we gained from our 
conversations with representatives. Users talked of the need for persistence, of wearing down 
a reluctant bureaucracy until they gave in to demands; managers spoke of the frustration of 
dealing with users who clearly did not understand either technical issues or the bigger picture; 
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and workers spoke of the difficulties they faced in meetings, being unable to speak out 
against managers, but equally feeling on the receiving end of the criticisms levelled by users 
in their denunciation of health service provision. These tensions are played out in the space of 
the meeting. Styles of interaction echo the different purposes that the council serves, from the 
adversarial, distrustful stance of user representatives in contests with the state through to the 
posture of consultation, with users and workers listening to and asking questions of the 
managers, to a more collaborative relationship, with users and workers making suggestions 
together, and management agreeing with them. These different purposes are held in a 
permanent tension and create significant paradoxes for what participation in the council 
comes to mean to different members.  
 
Deliberation in the council often appears to be less about content than procedure; quite what 
councillors actually understand deliberation to mean says more about their perceived role in 
auditing and authorising decisions than in deliberating the nature of health policy and the 
content of health plans, as the following quote from a user representative illustrates: 
 
We are not a consultative body; we are a body that deliberates. The manager has 
his/her own planning team … he or she makes an action plan, what is going to be 
spent on health … he or she comes here and presents to us what is going to be spent 
within the plan for each account. It comes to us, we take a good look at it and then we 
say if we approve the plan or not. If it is approved the government can go ahead with 
it, it can spend the money approved … it is up to me, as a councillor, each three 
months, to say where it has advanced, because accounts are rendered every three 
months…. The Council audits them really closely, members have the right to go to 
take a look for themselves; if it is wrong, we can stop it. That is the role of the 
council. 
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Framed in this way, realising the right to health involves making sure the municipal health 
secretariat and the medical staff they employ do their job: discussions rarely stray outside the 
frame of what that job is defined as by the government. There are strict rules that are set by 
central government about the proportion of money that should be spent on primary care, and 
guidelines and models for the delivery of care at that level that municipal governments can 
opt out of, but doing so may present political risks, which are better avoided. Municipal 
health secretariats can, however, contract out a greater proportion of secondary and tertiary 
care to the private sector, if they wish, and pursue health plans that give less priority to the 
health rights of the poor. As one union activist – a former CMS representative and a regular 
and vocal figure in CMS meetings – pointed out, it was the job of the CMS to hold the 
government to account for the resolutions made in the health conference, not to make policy. 
Yet even he conceded that the long shopping list of promises that constituted these 
resolutions necessitated prioritisation, and that the lack of citizen engagement in that 
prioritisation process potentially undermined the prospects citizens had for holding the 
government to account for its role in realising their right to health. 
 
The worlds of the bureaucrat and the citizen tend to intersect most on questions of probity, 
and very rarely around issues that might be regarded as ‘technical’. There have been notable 
exceptions. The current chair combed through the epidemiological report for the previous 
year and found a large number of untreated cases of one prevalent condition, which he 
brought to the health council as a concern. It was, however, not a concern that was debated: 
he simply informed them that he had composed a letter to the authorities noting the incidence 
of this condition, and calling for more attention to be paid to providing effective medical 
treatment. It was evident that his own technical knowledge did not extend to knowing exactly 
what that treatment might be – unlike treatment activists in other contexts, including parts of 
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Brazil, who would be able to demand specific medication. What mattered, for him, was 
putting on the record that not enough was being done: a form of interaction with the 
authorities that was as familiar to him, from his activist background, as it was to a number of 
his fellow councillors. It needs to be remembered that he, like many user representatives, has 
rudimentary education and does not come from a medical background. To take up an issue 
like this is in itself evidence of the kinds of changes that the CMS has made possible. It is, 
however, an exception: many of the most effective challenges to the municipal health 
secretariat tend to come from people with medical training, who are able to directly pursue 
lines of argumentation that are simply not available to ordinary citizens.  
 
Making a difference 
Despite difficulties and contradictions, CMS actors have been relatively capable of taking 
initiatives, speaking out, expressing criticism, proposing and resisting in their role as civil 
society representatives. Acting autonomously, they have sought allies in social movements 
and within the state on certain issues of mutual concern, such as outsourcing of services. 
Common political sympathies – such as anti-privatisation sentiments – create bridges across 
the health council, and have worked to strengthen the power of the CMS in seeking to 
withstand the tide of marketisation that threatens the public health system. Where the 
municipal government’s policies are in the interests of poorer members of the community – 
and this could be said, by and large, for the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) government that 
was in office when we carried out this research – then this auditing role within the broader 
ambit of a SUS that delivers on its promises of equity and equality makes management and 
political sense. Yet much comes to depend on the character of individual bureaucrats, as on 
the broader agenda of the municipal government. The scope for conflict and co-option is as 
present in these spaces as that for collaboration, and civil society representatives may adopt a 
range of strategies for engagement, which put them into conflict with each other. 
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Shifting alliances and commonalities between health bureaucrats, health workers and user 
representatives complicate attempts to categorise actors as part of bounded interest groups. 
These alliances take shape in other spaces – the space of the party office, the church, the 
neighbourhoods in which councillors live. Party affiliation may make more of a difference 
when it comes to some issues; belonging to a common faith may matter more when it comes 
to others. Debates in the space of the council call on these allegiances, and on cultural styles 
familiar from other spaces: they are often characterised less by the kind of detached rational 
argumentation that is evoked in the writings of deliberative democrats than by other 
processes of persuasion that are laden with power, whether bound up with personal loyalty, 
religious belief or belief in superior knowledge or expertise, and political strategies and 
tactics that make the CMS an intensely political arena. 
 
When councillors were asked what difference the council had actually made to the well-being 
of people in the municipality, the answers were often couched in terms of the kinds of 
successes claimed by the municipal health secretariat. Health bureaucrats emphasised the 
importance of the CMS in creating a bridge with civil society, as much as some 
acknowledged the limitations that civil society representatives had in understanding the 
complexities of health provisioning. For a number of the user representatives, the successes 
of the CMS were closely identified with making the health system function better: they 
pointed to the successes of the CMS in dealing with demands to guarantee service provision 
and improve the quality of care, thus contributing to the accomplishment of municipal health 
plans and improving basic health care units, access to tests, specialised outpatient centres, 
social mobilisation for municipal conferences, and the establishment of local health councils.  
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There seems to be a broad acknowledgement by the actors involved that the existence of the 
council has made some contribution to reducing the practice of clientelism and exchange of 
favours as the predominant form of access to health services in Cabo. Similarly, there has 
been an increase in public recognition and identification of privileges existing in the sector as 
well as the possibility of fighting to end them. Yet a number of current as well as former user 
representatives were much more circumspect about the successes of the CMS. Yes, they said, 
there had been gains: the council is an institution worth having. But they highlighted a wide 
range of concerns, from the ‘party-isation’ of the space of the council, to the compacts 
between government and user representatives benefiting from service contracts that 
complicate prospects for accountability, to the lack of voice of more marginal members, 
silenced as much through fear of the repercussions of speaking up as through their own lack 
of confidence in what they might have to say. For some, these factors neutralised the 
potential of the council as a mechanism of controle social; for others, they were an inevitable 
part of it, something which required constant vigilance as well as active strategies for its 
further democratisation.  
 
A further dimension of reflections on the council concerns the gap between the ideals of the 
SUS and the realities of scarce resources, and the difficulties of ever overcoming the barriers 
to access experienced by those with complex and expensive conditions that simply could not 
be treated effectively at this level because of shortcomings in the ways services are 
articulated. These raise larger concerns about the very way in which the SUS is organised, 
and about the tensions between democratising priority setting and the medical exigencies 
with which planners of public health have to deal in order to be able to contribute to 
guaranteeing the right to health.  
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Realising the CMS as an accountability space 
Even when the practice of participatory governance institutions does not meet the 
expectations that were created as part of the political struggle that led to their 
institutionalisation, most case studies conducted in Brazil stress their ‘positive impact on the 
process of construction of a more democratic culture in Brazilian society’ (Dagnino 2002: 
162). The significance of this impact cannot be underestimated in a country with such an 
entrenched authoritarian tradition as Brazil, which combines state centralisation with local 
clientelism, and where economic modernisation and the location of Brazil within 
international capitalism has been conducted under an authoritarian regime, worsening its 
elitist and exclusionary character. Institutionalised participatory spaces such as the CMS 
contribute, by and large, to the collective political effort to democratise the implementation of 
public policies in Brazil, since (1) they confront elitist conceptions of democracy, (2) they 
challenge authoritarian conceptions about the primacy of “technicians” and “the technical” in 
state decision-making processes, (3) they challenge state monopoly over the definition of 
what is public and what the public agenda should be, and (4) they contribute to reducing 
clientelism and to more transparency in government actions (Dagnino 2002).   
 
From what we gathered in Cabo, the signs are there that the process of creating spaces for 
accountability is having some effect on the culture of politics, with the hope expressed by 
some councillors that the expansion of local councils will serve to further open, and broaden, 
spaces for participation. It is evident, however, that simply creating spaces for citizen 
participation is no guarantee that old political practices will not simply be reproduced within 
them (Cornwall 2002). The council is an intermediary space. It is one that lies in between a 
series of other spaces: those of associations, of the bureaucracy, of health providers, of 
political parties and a range of other social and governmental actors. It is one threaded 
through with relationships, with party political alliances, clientage relationships and tensions. 
Chapter 7 
Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability 
 19
Social actors representing civil society are far from autonomous vis-à-vis a municipal 
government which gives many of them small grants to support their activities, and has 
contracts with others to deliver services. Neither civil society nor the state can be thought of 
as constituting a homogeneous bloc; and amidst the universe of civil society organisations in 
Cabo there exists tremendous diversity in terms of capabilities to engage in these spaces, as 
much as in their own internal democracy and accountability and claims to legitimacy, which 
further complicate their interactions within the space of the council.  
 
To be effective in holding the state to account, health councils require a range of resources – 
the provision of which goes beyond the means and the responsibility of civil society 
members. Funds are needed to support the everyday functioning of the council, to provide a 
space to meet and someone to organise meetings, keep records and notify councillors of any 
pertinent changes in policies or upcoming events that require their attention. Financial 
resources are also required to support the training of representatives, not just from the users’ 
segment – who require information on the structure and functioning of the health system, and 
on interpreting accounts and budgets to be effective – but also from the health workers and 
managers’ segments, to equip them with the capabilities to participate in this kind of forum. 
Beyond these material resources, there are further technical and symbolic resources that are 
critically important if councils are to have ‘teeth’. Active participation by user and health 
worker representatives is often not matched by commitment from managers, whose inaction 
and perceived lack of respect for councillors undermines the potential of the CMS as a space 
for accountability.  
 
Although managers often voice professions of intent and eulogies regarding the importance 
of citizen participation in controle social, their conduct is perceived by many user 
representatives to reveal a very different attitude. The municipal government was charged by 
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some user representatives with failing to provide adequate and timely information; seeking to 
drive through plans and budgets at short notice; giving councillors very little chance to find 
out and debate what they entailed; and exerting ‘pressure’ at key decision-making moments. 
There is a significant consensus among user representatives – shared by some health worker 
councillors – that the lack of value given to the CMS by the bureaucracy acts as a critical 
brake on its effectiveness. There remains amongst bureaucrats a very real tension between the 
legitimacy the CMS can offer them, and a perception that ‘the council wants to be the 
manager’, displacing what they see as properly their prerogative in making decisions about 
public health.  
 
Contests over the meaning of controle social lie at the heart of the ambivalent relationship 
between managers, workers and users in the CMS. Conflicts and tensions between users and 
managers can be interpreted in terms of contestation over two distinct although not entirely 
incompatible conceptions about accountability through participation. One conception 
(commonly held by managers) sees participation as a model for the management of public 
policies and another one (generally that of users) understands participation as a process of 
democratisation of those policies. Of course, that does not mean that managers are not 
interested in democratising the process, or that users do not see management as relevant. But 
it does shed light on why the demarcation of issues as ‘technical’ becomes so important in the 
conflicts that arise in spaces of controle social over public policies, and it is linked precisely 
to the struggle for effective power sharing between state and civil society actors in those 
spaces. On one hand, acknowledging the legitimacy of politicising the technical is a way for 
civil society actors to demand power sharing. On the other hand, the constant reaffirmation of 
the essentially technical character of decisions is an argument enabling state bureaucracy to 
retain maximal power. Which direction the balance tilts in will depend on actors’ political 
forces in distinct scenarios, and the result is always provisional.4 
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Conclusion 
      
For all the shortcomings people identified – and there were many – every one we spoke to, 
without exception, viewed the CMS as critical to the very possibility of accountability, and as 
an institution worth preserving no matter what difficulties were experienced in making it 
effective. People across the board – from the director of a maternity clinic to a temporary 
auxiliary health worker, to a worker at a programme for black youth, to the founder of a 
centre for herbal medicine – all felt that being part of this institution had provided them with 
opportunities for hearing new perspectives, learning new things and contributing to 
improving public health in Cabo. The very newness of this institution, and its counter-cultural 
nature in a political context marked by pervasive authoritarianism and clientelism, means that 
the potential for change may only be realised over a much longer term. The challenges are 
many, from changing the very dispositions of political society to transforming relationships 
in a sector marked by the hegemony of hierarchies of expertise. But there is every indication 
that, slowly, the CMS is beginning to make a difference, turning users into citizens who are 
aware that access to decent health services is not a favour, nor a privilege, but a right, and 
transforming a culture of clientelism into a culture of accountability. 
  
Realising that right and enabling the cultural shifts that are required for accountability calls 
for continued efforts to change relations of power that enable managers to frame consultation 
and control the agenda, that deny lower-level health workers a voice, and that work to 
undermine the possibility of democratising health policy and planning. Overcoming these 
obstacles is a challenge that calls for new and imaginative ways of breaking and remodelling 
the old cultural patterns that limit the exercise of citizenship. As one councillor put it: 
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When you begin to get the rights you have, and the way to seek those rights without 
the need for an intermediary, without favours or party-political bargains, then you 
change the character of the life of a society into one in which citizens have awareness, 
in which you know what you are entitled to. 
 
To fulfil their democratising potential, participatory governance institutions like health 
councils require more than citizen awareness and active citizen engagement – although this, 
and the further democratisation of the public sphere that would lend greater legitimacy and 
representativity to civil organisations, is a vital precondition for their role in making the work 
of controle social effective. What is also needed is an active, engaged and enabling state, a 
state whose bureaucrats recognise the role of accountability in democratic governance and 
who respect their obligations in creating the conditions and providing the resources that can 
facilitate citizen engagement – both material and symbolic. On one hand, efforts to enhance 
accountability need to reckon not only with an often idealised model of ‘civil society 
participation’ but with particular and shifting configurations of state–society relations, and 
the extent to which such configurations condition the possibility of accountability and require 
a range of potential strategies on the part of social actors – whether inside ‘invited spaces’ 
such as the health council or in ‘popular spaces’ outside them. On the other hand, they need 
to take account not only of the possibilities presented by enabling legislative and institutional 
frameworks, but also of pervasive political culture. There are, in short, no easy recipes, and 
for all the enabling conditions that would seem to exist in this case – supportive legislation, a 
municipal government that has at least provided some material support and had a public 
commitment to participation, a strong and organised civil society – the struggle for 
accountability in Cabo continues.  
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Notes 
1 This chapter is based on participatory research carried out in collaboration between the three authors – the ex-
chair of Cabo’s Municipal Health Council and director of the Centro das Mulheres do Cabo, a local feminist 
NGO; a political economist from the Rural University of Rio de Janeiro; and an anthropologist from the IDS, 
Sussex – and members of Cabo’s health council and of the municipal administration. Parts of this paper are 
drawn from a longer paper (Cordeiro, Cornwall and Delgado 2004) prepared as part of the DfID-ActionAid 
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Brazil Olhar Critico (‘A Critical Gaze at Practices of Citizenship and Participation in Brazil’) project. Thanks to 
Alex Shankland for comments.  
2 See Goetz and Jenkins (2004) on different dimensions of and interpretations of ‘accountability’, and Cornwall, 
Lucas and Pasteur (2000) on these issues with reference to the health sector. 
3 Derived from cards produced at a participatory workshop held in Cabo on April 12, 2004, which included 
users’ and health workers’ representatives. Health managers chose not to attend. 
4 In countries with authoritarian political culture such as Brazil, it is probably more realistic to assume that the 
balance has a fatal attraction to State actors. 
 
 
 
 
